How Richard Perle forced me to start blogging again.

In this opinion piece for the Wall Street Journal, Thomas Frank has a little fun with Richard Perle's insistence that neoconservatism is a mere pigment of the conspiracy theorists' imagination. Because, as Leo Strauss believed, we the people are dumb enough to fall for anything. And we should be thankful that an enlightened philosopher-king like George Bush or Barack Obama can lead us in the right direction, following the requisite references to religion, of course.

Frank writes:

But in a remarkable bit of blame evasion, Mr. Perle steps forward to tell us why neocons like him can in no way be held responsible for the Bush administration's failures. In fact, they had nothing to do with it. He, he writes, has "been widely but wrongly depicted as deeply involved in the making of administration policy."

And neither were any of his ideas compromised in Iraq. "But about the many mistakes made in Iraq, one thing is certain: they had nothing to do with ideology," Mr. Perle writes. "They did not draw inspiration from or reflect neoconservative ideas and they were not the product of philosophical or ideological influences outside the government."

That's a sweeping denial. But one wonders how any human act can be completely free of "philosophical or ideological influence," and, moreover, how Mr. Perle can possibly know that neoconservative ideas inspired nobody and nothing. After all, he himself has generated countless pages of foreign-policy advice over the years, including a 2003 book about the war on terrorism for which "rabid" would be too weak a description.

Perle and his friends have no problem with the making of sweeping denials. They can rely on the lack of transparency and accountability in the American political system to keep a thick fog hovering over what goes on behind closed doors in Washington, DC. But when Mr. Perle started speaking to the press, he opened the doors,  stepped into the spotlight, made a few dishonest statements, and then wondered why the light felt so darn bright. And hot. And disconcerting.

At a discussion of the article televised by C-Span last Thursday, Mr. Perle went even farther, facing down a room full of critics and telling them at one point that "there is no such thing as a neoconservative foreign policy." (Thus setting up the Washington Post's headline, "Prince of Darkness Denies Own Existence.")

Stunning. What a courageous and utterly nonsensical assertion on the part of Mr. Perle. Perhaps the time he spent in the insulated, self-congratulatory atmosphere of the Bush White House has dimmed his cognitive capacity.

Let's talk about neoconservatism. First, to make sure that we are all on the same page, let's define and articulate the neoconservative worldview. After we have established the existence of neoconservatism as a political worldview, let's take a few minutes to seek the mysterious and nonexistent neoconservative foreign policy. Then, to make sure that the neoconservative foreign policy is real, as opposed to imaginary, let's trace its influence on American foreign policy.

In an article for his magazine, The Weekly Standard, Irving Kristol, considered by many to be the big daddy of neoconservatism, outlines the neocon worldview in his own words. I've excerpted a large portion of the article to provide a well-rounded look at the neoconservative worldview and provide a fair taste of Mr. Kristol's verbal charm:

Neoconservatism is the first variant of American conservatism in the past century that is in the "American grain." It is hopeful, not lugubrious; forward-looking, not nostalgic; and its general tone is cheerful, not grim or dyspeptic. Its 20th-century heroes tend to be TR, FDR, and Ronald Reagan. Such Republican and conservative worthies as Calvin Coolidge, Herbert Hoover, Dwight Eisenhower, and Barry Goldwater are politely overlooked. Of course, those worthies are in no way overlooked by a large, probably the largest, segment of the Republican party, with the result that most Republican politicians know nothing and could not care less about neoconservatism. Nevertheless, they cannot be blind to the fact that neoconservative policies, reaching out beyond the traditional political and financial base, have helped make the very idea of political conservatism more acceptable to a majority of American voters. Nor has it passed official notice that it is the neoconservative public policies, not the traditional Republican ones, that result in popular Republican presidencies........

Neocons do not like the concentration of services in the welfare state and are happy to study alternative ways of delivering these services. But they are impatient with the Hayekian notion that we are on "the road to serfdom." Neocons do not feel that kind of alarm or anxiety about the growth of the state in the past century, seeing it as natural, indeed inevitable. Because they tend to be more interested in history than economics or sociology, they know that the 19th-century idea, so neatly propounded by Herbert Spencer in his "The Man Versus the State," was a historical eccentricity. People have always preferred strong government to weak government, although they certainly have no liking for anything that smacks of overly intrusive government....

The steady decline in our democratic culture, sinking to new levels of vulgarity, does unite neocons with traditional conservatives--though not with those libertarian conservatives who are conservative in economics but unmindful of the culture. The upshot is a quite unexpected alliance between neocons, who include a fair proportion of secular intellectuals, and religious traditionalists. They are united on issues concerning the quality of education, the relations of church and state, the regulation of pornography, and the like, all of which they regard as proper candidates for the government's attention. And since the Republican party now has a substantial base among the religious, this gives neocons a certain influence and even power. Because religious conservatism is so feeble in Europe, the neoconservative potential there is correspondingly weak.

here is no set of neoconservative beliefs concerning foreign policy, only a set of attitudes derived from historical experience. (The favorite neoconservative text on foreign affairs, thanks to professors Leo Strauss of Chicago and Donald Kagan of Yale, is Thucydides on the Peloponnesian War.) These attitudes can be summarized in the following "theses" (as a Marxist would say): First, patriotism is a natural and healthy sentiment and should be encouraged by both private and public institutions. Precisely because we are a nation of immigrants, this is a powerful American sentiment. Second, world government is a terrible idea since it can lead to world tyranny. International institutions that point to an ultimate world government should be regarded with the deepest suspicion. Third, statesmen should, above all, have the ability to distinguish friends from enemies. This is not as easy as it sounds, as the history of the Cold War revealed. The number of intelligent men who could not count the Soviet Union as an enemy, even though this was its own self-definition, was absolutely astonishing.

Finally, for a great power, the "national interest" is not a geographical term, except for fairly prosaic matters like trade and environmental regulation. A smaller nation might appropriately feel that its national interest begins and ends at its borders, so that its foreign policy is almost always in a defensive mode. A larger nation has more extensive interests. And large nations, whose identity is ideological, like the Soviet Union of yesteryear and the United States of today, inevitably have ideological interests in addition to more material concerns. Barring extraordinary events, the United States will always feel obliged to defend, if possible, a democratic nation under attack from nondemocratic forces, external or internal. That is why it was in our national interest to come to the defense of France and Britain in World War II. That is why we feel it necessary to defend Israel today, when its survival is threatened. No complicated geopolitical calculations of national interest are necessary.

Behind all this is a fact: the incredible military superiority of the United States vis-à-vis the nations of the rest of the world, in any imaginable combination. This superiority was planned by no one, and even today there are many Americans who are in denial. To a large extent, it all happened as a result of our bad luck. During the 50 years after World War II, while Europe was at peace and the Soviet Union largely relied on surrogates to do its fighting, the United States was involved in a whole series of wars: the Korean War, the Vietnam War, the Gulf War, the Kosovo conflict, the Afghan War, and the Iraq War. The result was that our military spending expanded more or less in line with our economic growth, while Europe's democracies cut back their military spending in favor of social welfare programs. The Soviet Union spent profusely but wastefully, so that its military collapsed along with its economy.

Suddenly, after two decades during which "imperial decline" and "imperial overstretch" were the academic and journalistic watchwords, the United States emerged as uniquely powerful. The "magic" of compound interest over half a century had its effect on our military budget, as did the cumulative scientific and technological research of our armed forces. With power come responsibilities, whether sought or not, whether welcome or not. And it is a fact that if you have the kind of power we now have, either you will find opportunities to use it, or the world will discover them for you.

Neoconservatism's Marxist-Hegelian roots are fully evident in the last line. Like Marxists of all stripes, neoconservatives believe that History is on the march. In fact, Stalin, who picked and chose what to imbibe from Marx, could never have maintained his dictatorship if he was unable to promise the Soviet citizens that utopia was on the way, that Russia was to be the greatest nation in the world, the launch-pad for the global communist revolution, the great exporter of human freedom. History was on Stalin's side. And the workers' side. And the neoconservatives' side. Both Marxists and neocons share this dialectical conception of history-- it is a History so powerful that no Gods are needed. Only human power.

Unfortunately for the communist revolution, its citizens discovered that human freedom seemed to be shrinking, not growing, wherever the communist militaries roamed. The promised utopia never materialized, and the global communist revolution wasn't an easy export since it had to be maintained by force, which eventually destroyed the economy. For those who have forgotten, war is expensive (which, of course, explains why neoconservatives lean towards the supply-side approach which encourages deficit spending). Hopefully, the terms "free markets" and "democracy" will not take the route of "communism" in the areas of the world where American troops are exporting democracy with the precision of a gun. Because democracy by force will faill

For another look at neoconservatism from a Hegelian former-neocon, let's look at a 2006 article for The New York Times Magazine in which Frank Fukuyama distances himself from the failed neoconservative foreign policy associated with the Bush administration while continuing to chant the "export democracy" chorus and revel in foreign policy idealism. Fukuyama writes:

More than any other group, it was the neoconservatives both inside and outside the Bush administration who pushed for democratizing Iraq and the broader Middle East. They are widely credited (or blamed) for being the decisive voices promoting regime change in Iraq, and yet it is their idealistic agenda that in the coming months and years will be the most directly threatened. Were the United States to retreat from the world stage, following a drawdown in Iraq, it would in my view be a huge tragedy, because American power and influence have been critical to the maintenance of an open and increasingly democratic order around the world. The problem with neoconservatism's agenda lies not in its ends, which are as American as apple pie, but rather in the overmilitarized means by which it has sought to accomplish them. What American foreign policy needs is not a return to a narrow and cynical realism, but rather the formulation of a "realistic Wilsonianism" that better matches means to ends.

Fukuyama maintains that neoconservatism, properly construed, did not have to end with the debacle of Iraq. He notes four common "principles or threads" laced neoconservative thinking during the Cold War:

".... a concern with democracy, human rights and, more generally, the internal politics of states; a belief that American power can be used for moral purposes; a skepticism about the ability of international law and institutions to solve serious security problems; and finally, a view that ambitious social engineering often leads to unexpected consequences and thereby undermines its own ends."

Neoconservatives supported Reagan's hard-line on communism. During the Cold War, neocons filled the Republican Party ranks with Cold Warriors and Red Crusaders. They legitimized this anti-Communism for former comrades in the New Left and liberal hawks. Marxists were wrong about the direction of the march of history-- in Fukuyama's famous words, "the end of history" would be the establishment of global democracy. Such happy, hopeful, inspiring ideas provide political justification for a strong, big government who, like the USSR, must tread on a few liberties, engage in a few massacres, and eradicate a few inhospitable ethnic groups should they stand in the way of History. Without the neoconservatives, politicians like Mayor Rudy Giuliani would never have aligned themselves with the Republican Party.

Unfortunately, these "principles" had not been properly vetted for consistency by the neoconservative intellectuals. Fukuyama notes that "two of these principles were in potential collision":

The skeptical stance toward ambitious social engineering — which in earlier years had been applied mostly to domestic policies like affirmative action, busing and welfare — suggested a cautious approach toward remaking the world and an awareness that ambitious initiatives always have unanticipated consequences. The belief in the potential moral uses of American power, on the other hand, implied that American activism could reshape the structure of global politics. By the time of the Iraq war, the belief in the transformational uses of power had prevailed over the doubts about social engineering.

Now we are prepared to approach the present-- to examine the place where Mr. Perle can stand and insist that there is no such thing as neoconservative foreign policy. Since we know that there IS such a thing as a neoconservative, and we assume they MUST have opinions of some shape on US foreign policy, we can try to discover what these neoconservatives think would be appropriate in the realm of American foreign policy. Fortunately, we don't have to rely on second-hand news for this information. Instead, we can look inside the horses' mouths.

In 1996, Richard Perle led a study group at the American Enterprise Institute which produced a document, "A New Israeli Strategy Toward 2000". This study group intended to produce a set of recommendations for the incoming Netanyahu administration in Israel. One of its members, Robert Lowenberg, participated in his position as president of the Israeli-American Institute for Advanced Political and Strategic Studies.

Apart from providing an clear picture of Mr. Perle's foreign policy perspective, the study group introduces other famous neoconservative names, including Douglas Feith, who served as Under Secretary of Defense Policy from 2001 to 2005. In this position, Feith helped organize, plan, and prosecute the war in Iraq, including managing the now defunct Office of Special Plans which consolidated intelligence on Iraq. In 2005, Feith left his office under the Bush administration amid invetsigations into allegations that he deliberately skewed intelligence on Iraq to bolster arguments and provide a strategic justification for going to war with Iraq.

So this document provides insight on the neoconservative foreign policy position (pace Perle). Among other things, it is notable for its rejection of the Arab-Israeli peace process, disdain for "land for peace" approaches, arguing for a tough line in the treatment of Palestinians, clearly delineating "friends" and "foes" in the Middle East, and, well, removing Saddam. 

Israel can shape its strategic environment, in cooperation with Turkey and Jordan, by weakening, containing, and even rolling back Syria. This effort can focus on removing Saddam Hussein from power in Iraq — an important Israeli strategic objective in its own right — as a means of foiling Syria’s regional ambitions. Jordan has challenged Syria's regional ambitions recently by suggesting the restoration of the Hashemites in Iraq. This has triggered a Jordanian-Syrian rivalry to which Asad has responded by stepping up efforts to destabilize the Hashemite Kingdom, including using infiltrations. Syria recently signaled that it and Iran might prefer a weak, but barely surviving Saddam, if only to undermine and humiliate Jordan in its efforts to remove Saddam.

But Syria enters this conflict with potential weaknesses: Damascus is too preoccupied with dealing with the threatened new regional equation to permit distractions of the Lebanese flank. And Damascus fears that the 'natural axis' with Israel on one side, central Iraq and Turkey on the other, and Jordan, in the center would squeeze and detach Syria from the Saudi Peninsula. For Syria, this could be the prelude to a redrawing of the map of the Middle East which would threaten Syria's territorial integrity.

Since Iraq's future could affect the strategic balance in the Middle East profoundly, it would be understandable that Israel has an interest in supporting the Hashemites in their efforts to redefine Iraq, including such measures as: visiting Jordan as the first official state visit, even before a visit to the United States, of the new Netanyahu government; supporting King Hussein by providing him with some tangible security measures to protect his regime against Syrian subversion; encouraging — through influence in the U.S. business community — investment in Jordan to structurally shift Jordan’s economy away from dependence on Iraq; and diverting Syria’s attention by using Lebanese opposition elements to destabilize Syrian control of Lebanon.

The study's conclusions provide one of many different policy perspectives on Israeli national security. This particular perspective seems to be predominant when so-called neoconservatives are voicing their opinions or authoring papers or sharing cocktails. As a result, various fools have assumed that all the papers, debates, articles, books, studies, and nonprofits supporting this policy perspective which also just so happen to be authored by putative neoconservatives must somehow represent a foreign policy consensus, or position, among the neoconservative community.

For those interested in learning more about neoconservatism, there are a number of great books and articles on the topic. I included as many links to defenses of neoconservatism as I could find so as to properly represent their views:

1. America At The Crossroads: Democracy, Power, and the Neoconservative Legacy by Francis Fukuyama is availabe on google books for free.
2. Reflections of a Neoconservative: Looking Back, Looking Ahead by Irving Kristol is the definitive statement of a self-described neocon.
3. "The Neoconservative Moment" by Frank Fukuyama.
4. "Conservatives and Neoconservatives" by A. Wolfson.
5. "America Unbound: The Bush Revolution in Foreign Policy" by Ivo Daadler and JM Lindsay.
6. The Neoconservative Revolution by Murray Friedman.
7. "Remaking the World: Bush and the Neoconservatives" by Joshua Micah Marsall.
8. "How Neoconservatives Conquered Washington and Launched A War" by Michael Lind.
9. "Kosovo: A Neoconservative Victory" by Brendan Simms might be inspiring for some neoconservatives.
10. "After Neoconservatism" by Frank Fukuyama.
11. "Neoconservatism's Future: It's Still the Only Game in Town" by Joshua Muravchik provides an in-depth defense delivered with a smirk.
12. "What Is a Neoconservative? And Does It Matter?" by Dale Vree.
13. "The Neoconservatives: An Endangered Species" by Russell Kirk.
14. "Kristol identifies religion as primary issue in US politics" by Kathy Li raises the interesting question of religion's role in neoconservatism. Unfortunately, they share the Marxist view that religion is a "opiate for the masses", albeit a politically-useful one.
15. "The Neocons and Iraq" by Peter Berkowitz.
16. "Blueprint for a Mess" by David Rieff delves into the situation on the ground and the failures in Iraq.
17. "A Neoconservative's Caution" by Daniel Pipes reveals a neocon with a worried look on his face.
18. "Myths About Neoconservatism" by Max Boot offers a defense from a comrade.
19. "America's neoconservative world supremacists will fail" by Eric Hobsbawm.
20. "Ending the neoconservative nightmare" by Daniel Levy.
21. The Neoconservative Mind: Politics, Culture, and the War of Ideology by Gary Dorrien.
22. "The Neoconservative Blame Game" by David Rose.
23. "Interview with neoconservative scholar Robert Kagan" from Der Spiegel.
24. "American Conservatism: 1945-1995" by Irving Kristol.
25. "Defense, Democracy, and the War on Terrorism", a speech given by Douglas Feith in 2004.
26. "President Bush's neoconservatives were spawned right here in NYC" by Joe Hagan.
27. "The Missionary" by Ronald Steel explores the neocon relationship to Wilsonian idealism.
28. List of prominent neoconservatives from SourceWatch.
29. The Project for the New American Century's Statement of Principles.